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BOOK REVIEW

CIVIL LIBERTIES, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT
Race, Rights and Reparation: Law and the Japanese
American Internment by Eric K. Yamamoto, Margaret
Chon, Carol L. Izumi, Jerry Kang, and Frank H. Wu. Aspen Law & Business, 2001. Pp. 490. Softcover. $58.00
Reviewed by Harvey Gee*

I don't want any of them (persons of Japanese ancestry)
here. They are a dangerous element. There is no way to
determine

their loyalty.

...

It

makes no difference

whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese.
American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty.... [W]e must worry about the Japanese all the time

until he is wiped off the map.'
Well, my God! ... We have thousands and thousands of

Japanese here [in California]. We could have an invasion
here.2
We now know what we should have known then-not only
was that evacuation wrong, but Japanese-Americans were
3
and are loyal Americans.
Law Clerk to the Honorable Michael J. Watanabe, United States District
Court for the District of Colorado; Adjunct Instructor, University of Colorado;
Law Clerk to the Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Court for

the Southern District of California (2002-04); LL.M., The George Washington
University Law School; J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law; B.A. Sonoma
State University.
1. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 236 n.2 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (quoting testimony of General John L. DeWitt).
2. ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 115 (1997)
(quoting Earl Warren at the beginning of World War II).
3. ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL L. IZUMI, JERRY KANG, &
FRANK H. Wu, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE

AMERICAN INTERNMENT 400 (2001) (quoting President Gerald R. Ford's Procla-
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INTRODUCTION

After the September 11, 2001 ("September 11") terrorist
attacks, consistent with its long history of activism, the Japanese American Citizens League, as well as other Asian
Americans, spoke out almost immediately against the easy
answer of racial stereotyping and scapegoating, and resoundingly called for protection of Arab and Muslim Americans'
civil rights.5 In a panel discussion, long-time civil rights attorney Dale Minami drew parallels between the experiences
of Japanese Americans interned sixty-years ago and the fallout of September 11 in the form of legislation curtailing civil
rights. Minami viewed September 11 as a replay of Pearl
Harbor, and he cautioned against potential ensuing hysteria
by Americans directed at racial minorities who may not be
perceived as American.' This could lead to the deprivation of
civil rights during a time of war, when judicial standards may
become lax.7 For example, during World War II, despite subjecting the government's action to strict scrutiny, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the mass incarceration of persons of
Japanese ancestry without charges, notice, trial or due process, nor any evidence of espionage or sabotage.' With the exception of panel discussions and perhaps a constitutional law,
civil rights, or critical jurisprudence course, analyses combining history, contemporary social issues, and the law are typically found only in the pages of law review articles and books
authored by Critical Race theorists.
Critical Race Theory is an alternative approach to addressing the Asian American identity within race jurisprudence.
The Critical Race Theory Movement, comprised
mostly of racial minorities situated in the nation's law
mation 4417: An American Promise, 41 Fed. Reg. 35 (Feb. 20, 1976)).
4. The Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), the nation's oldest and
largest Asian American civil rights organization, was founded in 1929 to address issues of discrimination targeted specifically at persons of Japanese ancestry. Today, the JACL is committed to protecting the rights of all segments of
the Asian Pacific American community. See www.jacl.org (last visited Apr. 17,
2005).
5. Susan Kiyomi Serrano & Dale Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A
"ConstantCaution"ina IYme of Crisis, 10 ASIAN L.J. 37, 48-49 (2003).
6. Dale Minami et al., Sixty Years After the Internment: Civil Rights,
Identity Politics,and RacialProfiling,11 ASIAN L.J. 151, 154 (2004).
7. This laxity, at least, was evident during the 1940s, when the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the internment of Japanese Americans.
8. See Serrano & Minami, supra note 5, at 37-38.
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schools, seeks to challenge "the ways in which race and racial
power are constructed and represented in American legal culture and ... society. . . ."' In large part, Critical Race Theory
offers a distinct perspective to legal scholarship by revealing
the viewpoint of those who have historically been subjected to
social domination and subordination."° Critical Race Theory
scholars question "traditional assumptions of both liberals
and conservatives with respect to the goals and means of traditional civil rights reforms."" In recent years, many scholars
and activists have applied contemporary aspects of Critical
Race Theory in their analyses of the treatment of Asian
Americans in the United States in order to further their efforts to contribute to our understanding of the complexities of
society.12
an increasingly multicultural and multiracial
Against this backdrop, I suggest that consideration and
inclusion of Asian Americans is crucial to any meaningful exploration of the contemporary relationship between race and
the law. Yet the place of Asian Americans in race relations
remains ambiguous because they continue to exist in the
outmoded, but still dominant, black/white paradigm of racial
discourse in this country." The current representation of
Asian Americans in race jurisprudence proves that broadening of the present race relations discourse is needed to allow
those situated between black and white to articulate their experiences independent of the bipolar framework."
A.

Overview

Race, Rights and Reparation: Law and the Japanese
American Internment represents the latest development in
Asian American race jurisprudence. The book is a hybrid of
Critical Race Theory, which is often concentrated in anecdotal
narrative, and traditional doctrinal analysis. The casebook
9. CRITICAL RACE THEORY:

THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED

THE

MOVEMENT xiii (Kimber6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
10. See, e.g., Harvey Gee, Beyond Black and White: Selected Writings by
Asian Americans within the CiticalRace Theory Movement, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J.
759, 764 (1999); Harvey Gee, ChangingLandscapes: The Need for Asian Americans to Be Included in the Affirmative Action Debate, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 621,
642-44 (1996).
11. Gee, Beyond Black and White, supra note 10, at 762.
12. Id. at 763.
13. Id. at 763 n.12.
14. See id. at 763.
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sets into sharp relief the standard footnote references to the
WWII internment. Here, the main body of the casebook is exclusively devoted to this topic. Although released before the
September 11 attacks, the historical events since have made
this book even more relevant and timely. As Dale Minami and
other Asian American legal scholars have observed, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II is both
the factual and legal precedent for the detainment of individuals, mostly of Muslim or Arab descent, on the basis of
their conduct in alleged terrorist activities against the United
States, or their ties (however strong or tenuous) to terrorist
organizations. This notion is echoed in Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's rhetoric in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld," rejecting the reasoning and result of Korematsu v. UnitedStates" and the internment of Japanese citizens.'
The authors of Race, Rights and Reparation offer an indepth examination of the internment process." The casebook
is one of the most comprehensive and insightful contributions
on the subject to date. As ambitious and intriguing as its title
suggests, it presents a critical study of the now widely condemned internment of Japanese Americans during World
War II, including the social, economic, and political reasons
behind it.19
Race, Rights and Reparationmay be used in courses focusing on Asian Americans and the Law, Critical Jurisprudence, and other civil rights or constitutional law seminars.
Like traditional casebooks, it can serve as the centerpiece for
classroom discussion, and will encourage critical thinking.
Its balance of cases and commentary provides students with
sufficient context, direction, and explanation. Most of the
casebook's lessons come from a rigorous reading and analysis
of the internment cases themselves. Unlike many casebooks,
this is not a hard-cover, expensive tome that is boring and tedious. Instead, Race, Rights, and Reparation is softbound,
reasonably priced, and intriguing and compelling from start
15. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). This case will be discussed
in more detail in Part V of this Review. See discussion infra Part V.
16. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Korematsu is familiar to most law students as the
one case where the Court ostensibly applied the "strict scrutiny" standard of review, and still found the governmental action permissible.
17. See Kerrita McClaughlyn, LegalBeat,WASH. LAW., Sept. 2004 at 19.
18. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supranote 3, at xxiii.

19. See id. at xxiv.
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to finish.
Beyond cases, readers will also find rich documentary
material that makes traditional doctrinal analysis and federal civil procedure more engaging. This material brings
forth compelling stories of personal despair and sacrifice. For
example, family photographs and personal portraits detail
what daily life was like for Japanese American internees in
the assembly centers and camps situated behind barbed wire
under the watchful eyes of armed guards.
The book employs a comprehensive approach targeting a
broad audience, including law professors and law students,
graduate students in cultural studies programs, and civil
rights activists. Three themes run throughout the book: (1)
the tension between civil rights, civil liberties, and national
security; (2) the racial components of legal and social decisions and the extent to which the U.S. Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause20 protects the rights of racial minorities;
and, (3) the responsibility of governments to acknowledge
past historical human rights violations.2 '
Race, Rights and Reparation is logically organized
around these themes. The chapters contain an overview followed by a section of study modules which present talking
points and questions for readers concerning the previous
chapter. A list of additional readings supplements the materials at the close of each chapter. In the volume's introduction, the authors ask the compelling question: What role did
legalized racial discrimination play in the internment?2 2 An
answer is sought by close examination of the fine balancing of
civil liberties and national security concerns.
This Review discusses the insightful analysis offered by
Race, Rights and Reparation. Part Two introduces the content of the casebook, explores its descriptive sections, and examines the Japanese American internment in its appropriate
social, political, and historical context. 3 Part Three revisits
the Supreme Court's reasoning and holdings in the four major
internment cases discussed at length in Race, Rights and
24
Reparation.
Part Four discusses the Japanese American
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. See YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supranote 3, at xxiv.

20. U.S.

22. Id. at 5.
23. See discussion infra Part II.
24. See discussion infra Part III.
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Redress Movement of the 1980s. 25 Part Five analyzes the Supreme Court's unlawful combatant/unlawful detention cases
from the 2003 Term. 26 The conclusion weighs the significance
of Race, Rights and Reparationsin the continuously expanding genre of Asian American Legal Jurisprudence.
II. THE INTERNMENT IN CONTEXT
The first two chapters of Race, Rights and Reparation offer a thematic and historical introduction to the material. 2
The authors articulate Asian American legal history in America as largely composed of racial discrimination in immigration, citizenship and economics. Undeniably, this racial animus resulted in the internment.2 9
The internment of 120,000 Japanese Americans during
World War II is considered one of the twentieth century's
most prominent mass trampling of civil liberties." It has
been widely condemned as racist governmental and judicial
conduct toward the Japanese and Japanese Americans. 3 1 According to the authors, "[t]he internment was a process, not a
single event. Although the events leading to the incarceration of Japanese Americans at the assembly centers occurred
quickly, they were neither immediate nor simultaneous.3
Remarkably, at the time, none of the reports of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Federal Communications Commission, and Office of Naval Intelligence, rejecting the military's
assertion about Japanese Americans' espionage and sabotage,
were made public. 2 Even before the attacks on Pearl Harbor,
Japanese immigrants and their American-born children endured great hardship in this country because they were perceived as economic threats.' As such, they were subjected to
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
26. See discussion infra Part V.
27. See discussion infra Part VI.
28. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 3-92.
29. See Marco Simons, The Emergence of a Norm Against ArbitraryForced
Relocation, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 95, 110 (2002) (citing Comm'n on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 47212 (1997).
30. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU,supra note 3, at xxiii.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 104.
33. Id. at 161.
34. See id. at 37.
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official discrimination and political protest." Through legislation, boycotts, school segregation, and propaganda, the Japanese faced exclusion driven by fear and hostility.16 The flames
of anti-Japanese animus were further fueled by the bombing
of Pearl Harbor. 7
Race, Rights and Reparation succinctly, yet comprehensively, summarizes the events leading up to the internment
and the administrative procedures excluding Japanese
Americans from the West Coast. Although certain highranking government officials, including Attorney General
Francis Biddle, opposed the evacuation of Japanese Americans, President Franklin D. Roosevelt still signed Executive
Order 9066," granting the military the power to exclude persons from specified areas.39 President Roosevelt based his decision on the Roberts Commission's report concluding that the
Japanese living in America had committed espionage. ° Order
9066 implemented a racially based military system of curfew,
exclusion and internment of Japanese Americans.4 Specifically, the military ordered the internment of 120,000 persons
of Japanese ancestry, including 70,000 United States citizens,
until the end of the war.4" The military declared the entire
West Coast a designated military area under Executive Order
9066, despite the absence of evidence that Japanese Americans posed a danger of espionage. High-ranking military officials and European Americans were encouraged by propaganda and the persistent stereotype of the Japanese as
35. See id. at 37-38.
36. See YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 37-40.
37. Id. at 38.
38. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
39. Id
40. See YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 99. Hastily
drafted "by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, the Roberts Commission report concluded that Japanese living in America had committed espionage, contributing to the Pearl Harbor attacks." Id.
41. Executive Order 9066 granted to the Secretary of War the power to exclude all persons of Japanese ancestry from designated areas of special security
concern, notably large areas of the Pacific Coast. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7
Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
42. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 101; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943); see also Chris K. lijima, Shooting
Justice Jackson' "Loaded Weapon" at Ysar Hamdi" JudicialAbdication at the
Convergence ofKorematsu and McCarthy,54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 116 (2004)
("racial persecution of Japanese Americans aided a war effort by strengthening
a white American racial identity against an Asiatic foreign power").
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"foreigners" or treacherous saboteurs intent on conquering
the West Coast.43
It was made clear that the exclusion order was actually a
Japanese exclusion order by its selective enforcement only
against persons of Japanese ancestry.' Although persons of
Italian and German ancestry were able to take loyalty oaths
at hearings, Japanese Americans were not.45 As a result,
loyal Japanese Americans were uprooted from their homes
and separated from their families.
Chapters Three and Four describe the legal challenges to
the internment. 46 The analysis begins with a background discussion of the strict scrutiny standard of review. Over the
years, Korematsu has been taken for granted by mainstream
legal commentators as the obligatory citation for the origin of
41
the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny standard of review.
However, contrary to the popular perception that the Court
addressed the constitutionality of the internment, it did not.48
Korematsu only discussed the constitutionality of the exclu49
sion order.
In a separate article published after Race,
Rights and Reparation,co-author Frank Wu wrote:
Strangely, the internment cases appear to have evaded

43. See YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 38. General John L. DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command, quoted at the beginning of this review, shared a similar view, fearing that Japanese Americans
were aiding the Japanese Empire in the war effort. Specifically, "General
DeWitt feared that Japanese Americans were aiding the submarines by signaling them from shore." Id. at 98.
44. See id. at 39; see also Alfred C. Yen, Praisingwith Faint Damnation The Troubling RehabilitationofKorematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) ("These
People were forced to leave their homes, businesses, jobs and communities despite never being formally charged with any civil or criminal offense. The government's justification for this was simple and chilling: the ancestry of Japanese Americans made them likely to side with Japan during World War II").
45. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 240-41 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that although persons of German and Italian descent engaged in disloyal activities, they, unlike the Japanese, were not deprived of
their constitutional rights).
46. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 95-274.
47. See Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme Court Moves From Approving Internment ofJapaneseAmericans to DisapprovingArlirmative Action for African Americans, 1 MICH. J. RACE & LAW
165, 165-66 (1996). See discussion infra note 54 on strict scrutiny review.
48. Frank H, Wu, Profilingin the Wake of September 11: The Precedent of
the JapaneseAmerican Internment, 17 CRIM. JUST. 52, 55 (2002).
49. Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denal, 51
UCLA L. REV. 933, 949-52 (2004).
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the most basic question. That question is whether it is
constitutional to order the mass incarceration of persons
as to whom no individual showing of guilt has been made,
ostensibly because of national security, though also with
the use of racial classifications. 5°

The analysis offered in Race, Rights and Reparation
demonstrates that the invocation of strict scrutiny, the
strongest form of equal protection judicial review, is generally
fatal to race-based government action, but not when applied
to Asians and Asian Americans. 51 This occurs despite the fact
that strict scrutiny was a powerful tool later used regularly to
strike down Jim Crow segregation throughout public facilities. In an effort to reconcile this contradiction, Race, Rights
and Reparations' trenchant examination of the internment
cases offers a plausible explanation.
III. THE INTERNMENT CASES
Equal protection jurisprudence in the 1940s did not resemble, much less function like, equal protection jurisprudence at present. The authors argue that Hirabayashi v.
United State 3 (and Korematsu the following year) did not
embrace the contemporary three-tiered standard of meansends analysis.' Instead, the Supreme Court merely looked at
50. Wu, supra note 48, at 55.
51. Legal scholar Neil Gotanda argues that Japanese Americans were
treated as "foreign" and not as "Americans," and because of this social construction as foreigners, the traditional equal protections of the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply. See Neil Gotanda, "OtherNon- Whites" in American Legal
Histozy: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM L. REV. 1186, 1188 (1985) (book
review of Justice at Warby Peter Irons).
52. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Gayle v. Browder, 352
U.S. 903 (1956); New Orleans City ParkImprovement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S.
54 (1958).
53. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
54. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 103, 122, 353.
The Court conducts its constitutional analyses within an established framework. Because the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to
state action, the Supreme Court must first evaluate race-based affirmative action programs to determine if state action is involved. If so, the program is subject to judicial review under traditional equal protection analysis. In the years
following the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court recognized that
the minimal scrutiny standard of review was inadequate to protect persons from
racial discrimination. In response, the Court created a more searching standard
of review for race-based discrimination, making it harder for programs employing racial criteria to be deemed constitutional. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
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the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny of the government's "military necessity" justification for the curfew, exclusion, and internment.5 5 In doing so, it paid great deference to
the military.
Race, Rights and Reparation suggests that the war and
public perception at the time provide a partial explanation of
the Court's unanimous decisions in Hirabayashiand Yasui v.
United States,56 while the Court split in the later two cases,
Korematsu and Endo.57 The casebook is especially critical of
the Court's failure to closely examine the military's action in
hindsight.58 The authors argue that the majority Justices
largely disregarded the amicus briefs portraying Japanese
Americans as completely assimilated into the American community. 9 The legal history of the four most important cases
is then presented along with a detailed description of the
process allowing for the creation and maintenance of concentration camps for all individuals of Japanese descent, including American citizens fully assimilated into the mainstream
American culture. By all reasonable social measures other
than their skin color, each internee was just like other Americans. But nevertheless, to the government and the courts,
they were presumptively disloyal. °
448, 473 (1980); see also William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution,46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1979). This highest
level of review, strict scrutiny, is employed in cases involving suspect classifications such as race, religion, alienage or ethnicity. The Court has set forth a twopronged test for strict scrutiny review. To survive strict scrutiny, a racially discriminatory law must further a compelling government interest or purpose and
the means employed by the law must be narrowly tailored to that purpose. See
Holly Dyer, Comment, Gender-BasedAffirmative Action: Where Does It Fit in
the Tiered Scheme of Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 594
(1993) (describing the Court's three standards of equal protection review); see
also Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the
Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 172-77 (1984) (discussing potential
failings of the Court's use of multi-level scrutiny); see also Mark Strasser, The
Invidiousness of Invidiousness. On the Supreme Court'sAffirmative Action Jurisprudence, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 323, 338 (1994) (asserting that the
Court's invidious jurisprudence is "schizophrenic" because the Court changes its
definition of invidious so often).
55. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 353.
56. 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
57. ExparteEndo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
58. See YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 124-25.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 104-20 (discussing Gordon Hirabayashi's upbringing in Washington state and his participation in civic activities and the Court's writing in
Hirabayashiv. United States that Japanese Americans are presumptively dis-
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A. Hirabayashi v. United States6
Gordon Hirabayashi was convicted for violating Public
Proclamation No. 3,62 which imposed a curfew on all enemy
aliens and citizens of Japanese descent.63 Hirabayashi was
born and raised in Seattle, Washington, and had never been
to Japan.' He had no personal contacts in Japan." Like all
Japanese Americans, Hirabayashi was subject to General
DeWitt's curfew order, requiring him to be at home each
night from 8:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. 66 He was a student at the
University of Washington when he decided that he wanted to
challenge the constitutionality of the curfew and the exclusion order.67 He did so by violating it on separate occasions.68
Hirabayashi was convicted of two separate counts: intentionally violating the evacuation order and the curfew order.69
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law
about each conviction to the United States Supreme Court."
There, the Court avoided the difficult issues of evacuation
and internment, and instead simply upheld Hirabayashi's
Chief Justice Stone
conviction for violating the curfew.7
wrote the majority opinion, which reflected the established
social mood and political climate of the time. He explained
that at the time of the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, approximately two-thirds of those of Japanese descent on the
West Coast were United States citizens." It was only racism
and discrimination, he insisted, that "prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white population."73 But
when weighed against national security, Justice Stone reasoned that there was a reasonable basis for the curfew: "[w]e
cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience,
loyal).

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

320 U.S. 81 (1943).
7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Apr. 2, 1942).
Hirabayashi,320 U.S. at 88.
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id. at 83-84.
Ad.at 84.
Id.

69. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 105.

70. Hirabayashl 320 U.S. at 84-85.
71. Id. at 105.
72. Id. at 96. Justice Stone noted that most resided in California, Oregon,
and Washington at the time of the military regulation. Id.
73. Id.
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that in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with
an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than
those of a different ancestry."7 4 The Court's ultimately narrow ruling allowed the important social data and anecdotal
evidence discussed in the opinion to fall by the wayside. Justice William Douglas, in his concurrence, simply noted that
the curfew order, as opposed to an individualized process of
investigations and hearings, was the most practical measure
at the time. 9 Even Justice Frank Murphy, a well-known civil
libertarian jurist, concurred with the majority opinion. 6
Though he condemned racism, he nevertheless concluded that
after the Pearl Harbor attack, military necessity required a
substantial restriction of the personal liberty of U.S. citizens. 77
B. Yasui v.United States"
Minoru Yasui was a U.S. citizen and Second Lieutenant
in the Army Infantry Reserves.79 He was educated as a lawyer, employed in a Japanese consular office, and actively involved in the Japanese Americans Citizens League."0 He and
his family were ordered to leave their home and report for internment.81 Yasui, in fact, attempted to report for active duty
with the Army after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.82 He was
denied eight times.83 Decided the same day as Hirabayashi,
Yasui's conviction was sustained for the same reasons."
M

C. Korematsu v. United States85
The authors of the casebook postulate that legal analysis
74. Id. at 101.
75. Id. at 106-07.
76. Hirabayashi,320 U.S. at 109.
77. Id. at 112-13. Justice Murphy concluded that although the civil liberties
of certain U.S. citizens may be temporarily restricted during a time of war, they
should be fully restored after the crisis has passed. Id.at 114.
78. 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
79. Id. at 116.
80. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supranote 3, at 126.
81. See id. at 126-28. Yasui's father was a Japanese immigrant businessman and farm owner. Like Yasui, he was interned without evidence of potential
threat. See id. at 126-27.
82. Id. at 127
83. Id.
84. Yasui, 320 U.S. at 117.
85. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

2005

RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION

783

86
They explain
superceded factual analysis in Korematsu.
that the Court restricted its Korematsu holding to the question of the evacuation alone, again avoiding the issue of the
internment's constitutionality.8 7 As Hirabayashi had addressed the curfew order, so Korematsu involved the exclusion order. The majority treated Hirabayasbias precedent,
although it had only addressed the curfew, and it was further
persuaded that there was some difference between a nighttime curfew restriction and the indefinite mass exclusion of
members of one racial group from their homes and work
places.8 8
In Korematsu, Justice Black wrote for five members of
the Court, while Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion, and Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson dissented.
Fred Korematsu's lawyers wanted to characterize the internment as about race, since from the outset, Japanese
Americans were excluded from the West Coast under threat
of force, detained, and then immediately interned.8 9 In his
dissent, Justice Roberts agreed with framing the issue in
these terms."0 Though Korematsu argued that when Exclusion Order No. 3491 was promulgated in May of 1942, all danger of Japanese invasion of the West Coast no longer existed,
the Court was persuaded by the government's claims of military necessity and reasoned that although Exclusion Order
No. 34 may have been both over- and under-inclusive, it was
the practical measure at the time. 92 The Court based its decision upon General DeWitt's unsubstantiated finding that
Japanese Americans posed a real danger of espionage on the
West Coast.93 Accordingly, the Court upheld the Exclusion

86. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 153-58.
87. Id. at 155.
88. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 231 (1944); see also
YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZuMi, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 163.
89. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 154.
90. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225.
91. Id. at 216-17. Exclusion Order No. 34 was substantially based upon Executive Order 9066. Id. See Executive Order 9066, supranote 38.
92. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
93. Id. at 227-29. The casebook authors note:
The Korematsu majority described itself as compelled by military necessity to legitimate the exclusion. Yet the Court, by
its own words, did not then and does not now accept as dispositive the government's mere invocation of "military necessity" or "national security." The question therefore is not
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Order.94
According to Justice Black, the constitutionality of Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1," which came into effect eleven
days before Korematsu's arrest, and provided the authority to
detain individuals of Japanese ancestry, was never considered by the Court largely because it was not necessary to do
so.96 Justice Black closed his opinion by reiterating that
Japanese and Japanese Americans were not imprisoned
97
solely because of their race.
Justices Roberts and Murphy rejected the majority's findings in their powerful separate dissents:
This is not a case of keeping people off the streets at
night ...nor a case of temporary exclusion of a citizen
from an area for his own safety or that of the community,
nor a case of offering him an opportunity to go temporarily
out of an area where his presence might cause danger to
himself or to his fellows. On the contrary, it is the case of
convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to
imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry ....
The Government's argument, and the opinion of the
court, in my judgment, erroneously divide that which is
single and indivisible and thus make the case appear as if
the petitioner violated a Military Order ....
This exclusion of "all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien
and non-alien," from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military
necessity in the absence of martial law ought not to be approved.
Such exclusion goes over "the very brink of constitutional power"
and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.99
The tension between the majority and the dissenters reveals the two ways the issues may be framed, respectively: (1)
the internment was a colorblind process; or (2) it was based
on racial classifications motivated by discrimination. As it
had been before, in Hirabayashi,it was no surprise that even
whether the courts should ever intervene in political/military
decisions restricting civil liberties, but rather when.
YAMAMOTO, CHON, IzuMi, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 155.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
8 Fed. Reg. 982 (Jan. 21, 1943).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220-23.
See id. at 223.
Id. at 225-26 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 233-34 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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the Supreme Court was influenced by the great racism which
existed against Japanese American citizens during the 1940s.
Race, Rights and Reparation is critical of the Korematsu
Court's apparent contradictions: first, it announced the strict
scrutiny standard for evaluating racial classifications, while
simultaneously declaring the case was never about race; and
second, despite announcing strict scrutiny, the Court deferred
to the government's "military necessity" rationale.'00
D. ExParteEndol"
In contrast to the previous three cases, Mitsui Endo's
arose from a habeas corpus petition.' 2 Mitsui Endo, an
American citizen of Japanese ancestry, was initially removed
to the Tule Lake War Relocation Center, in California, and
03
later transferred to the Central Utah Relocation Center.
Endo was never served with process, nor did she appear in
the proceedings.' Endo alleged that she was a loyal and law
abiding American citizen, and as such was being held unlawfully and against her will, because no formal charges were
brought against her. 5 Her petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the District Court. 1°6
Yet again, Justice Douglas gave President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Congress the benefit of the doubt, and avoided
the constitutional issue.0 7 The majority opinion focused on
Hirabayashiand described the series of 108 Civilian ExcluThe Court in Endo
sion Orders issued by General DeWitt'
also spent considerable time discussing the establishment of
the War Relocation Authority ("WRA"). 9 Despite Justice
100. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 159.
101. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
102. Id. at 285. The trial court held the petition in abeyance until Hirabayashi and Yasui were decided. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supranote

3, at 173.
103. Endo, 323 U.S. at 284-85. The Tule Lake War Relocation Center was in
Newell, Modoc County, California. Endo was removed from there to the Central
Utah Relocation Center in Topaz, Utah. Idat 285.
104. Idat 285.
105. Id. at 294.
106. Id. at 285.
107. See YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supranote 3, at 173.
108. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 286-89.
109. Id. at 290-91. See Public Proclamation No. 8, 7 Fed. Reg. 8346 (Oct. 16,
1942). The WRA was characterized as a program with three goals: (1) maintaining the Relocation Centers as places of residence for evacuees; (2) segregating the loyal from the disloyal; and (3) relocating the loyal to selected communi-
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Douglas's strong critique of the Department of Justice's rationale for its process," 1 Endo was nevertheless devoid of any
discussion of the persistent underlying constitutional issue.
Considered together, these four test cases, especially Korematsu and Hirabayashi, represent internment jurisprudence, and have become obligatory citations for the strict
scrutiny standard of review. Race, Rights and Reparation
gives each case significantly deeper treatment than most
casebooks, illuminating this critical time in American legal
history.

IV. THE REDRESS MOVEMENT
It was not until Congress established the Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians"' to review
the facts and circumstances surrounding Executive Order
9066112 that an examination of the effects of the order on
American citizens and permanent residents was made. The
Commission reviewed the U.S. military directives requiring
the relocation and detention of Japanese Americans, and its
findings and conclusions were unanimous: "the record does
not permit the conclusion that military necessity warranted
the exclusion of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast."113
Later, President Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act
of 1988, 1 creating the Office of Redress Administration15 to
administrate the reparations programs, which gave Japanese
Americans a formal apology and reparations in the amount of
$20,000 for each surviving internee who was a U.S
citizen or
116
legal resident alien at the time of the internment.
Race, Rights and Reparation focuses on this redress
ties while detaining the disloyal. Endo, 323 U.S. at 291.
110. Endo, 323 U.S. at 294-302. Douglas was not persuaded by the government's characterization of the planned evacuation as a device to protect the
safety of the evacuees. Id.
111. A federal agency created by Congress in 1980 to investigate the Japanese American internment and make recommendations on a possible effort to
redress the internment of Japanese Americans. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVILIANS 1 (1982) [hereinafter PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED].

112. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
113. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 111, at 8.
114. 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 1989-1989d (2000).
115. Its full name is the Office of Redress Administration of the Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Justice ("ORA"). 28 C.F.R. § 74.2(h) (2004).
116. See 50 App. U.S.C. § 1989b-4(a)(1).
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movement of the 1980s in chapters Five and Six. 117 The primary focus is on the coram nobis"8 litigation of the mid-1980s
that reopened Korematsu, Hirabayashiand Yasui and ultimately revealed that during World War II the Departments of
Justice and War suppressed, doctored and altered exculpatory evidence indicating that the military evacuation and internment of Japanese Americans on the West Coast was unnecessary." 9
Through their coram nobis petitions, Fred
Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Min Yasui sought to
vacate their wartime convictions on grounds of government
prosecutorial misconduct and lack of military necessity. 2 '
Eventually, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui succeeded in
the litigation of their coram nobis petitions. However, because
the cases cannot be used to correct legal errors, the Supreme
Court's decisions during World War II remain good law.
V.

MODERN APPLICATION: THE

2003 TERM

Recent Supreme Court decisions (after the attacks of
September 11) involving enemy combatants used the same
segmented analysis as the internment cases discussed above
in avoiding a core constitutional issue: whether President
George W. Bush had the authority to detain unlawful combatants. The Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld" inferred the lessons of Hirabayashiand Korematsu, noting that in both cases
the majority emphasized the importance of striking a proper
balance between the grave harms done to an individual's civil
liberties and the dangers to the nation's security.'22 One
hopes that neither the present nor future Courts will arbitrarily defer to military necessity so easily and comfortably.
117. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 277-443.
118. A writ of coram nobis is "[a] procedural tool whose purpose is to correct
errors of fact only, and its function is to bring before the court rendering the
judgment matters of fact which, if known at the time judgment was rendered,
would have prevented its rendition."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (6th ed.

1990).
119. YAMAMOTO, CHON, IZUMI, KANG, & WU, supra note 3, at 294-309.
120. See id. at 280-81. The litigation brought allegations that the government relied upon false evidence and suppressed military reports that indicated
there was no real danger of Japanese espionage. See id. at 281. The genesis of
this litigation was the discovery of evidence by attorney and scholar Peter Irons
during research for his book, Justice at War: The Story of the JapaneseInternment Cases. Id. at 280-86.
121. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
122. Id at 2649-50.
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If the recent 1 detainee
decisions are to serve as a bellwether,
23
there is hope.

In 2004, the Supreme Court ruled on three cases involving enemy combatants. Each case argued that the enemy
combatant had the right to file a writ of habeas corpus allowing them to contest their detentions in court.
First, in Hamdi, Yasser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen, maintained that he had been mislabeled as a Taliban
fighter, and was denied due process. 2' Hamdi was born in
Louisiana in 1980.125 As a child, he and his family moved to
He resided in Afghanistan when he was
Saudi Arabia."
seized by the Northern Alliance and turned over to the U.S.
military.1

27

After an initial interrogation, Hamdi was re-

moved from Afghanistan to the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay in January 2002.12' The majority held that
Hamdi must be afforded due process and given a meaningful
opportunity to contest his detention. 29 The Court emphasized
the importance of the basic constitutional due process guarantee that prisoners can argue their innocence before a
court, 3 0 and found that Hamdi must be granted the same

right, and allowed to contest the government's basis for his
designation as an enemy combatant.13 1 The Court explicitly
rejected the administration's position that enemy combatants
are not entitled to traditional legal rights.'32 After the Court's
decision, the Justice Department agreed to release Hamdi after more than two years of detention during which time no
charges were filed and lawyers were withheld. 33 Hamdi was
released and returned to Saudi Arabia on the conditions that
123. This opinion is largely based upon Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dicta
in Hamdi, opining that the indefinite detention of American citizens without
trial would violate due process unless the procedure and circumstances surrounding the detention were justified by reason of security or were necessary to
free the military from serious burdens that might compromise its efficiency. Id.
at 2646-48.
124. Id. at 2636.
125. Id. at 2635.
126. Id.
127. Hamdi,124 S. Ct. at 2635-36.
128. Id. at 2636.
129. Id. at 2648-52.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

131. Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2648-49.
132. -1d.
133. See Richard B. Schmitt, U.S. Will Free Louisiana-Born "Enemy Combatant,"L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A25.
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terrorism, and agree
he give up his U.S. citizenship, renounce
4
government.1
U.S.
the
sue
to
not
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla,35
'" the narrow issue was whether
3
the habeasstatute ' conferred a right to judicial review of the
detention of aliens in a territory over which the United States
exercised plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not "ultimate
sovereignty." The Court, in order to avoid "rampant forum
shopping," held strictly to the "general rule that for core habeas petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement."
137

Finally, Rasul v. Bush3 addressed whether the sixhundred detainees at the American naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, could challenge the legality of their detention in U.S. courts on the basis that none were enemy combatants or terrorists.'3 9 Petitioners claimed: (1) no charges
were filed against them; (2) they were not provided counsel;
and (3) they were denied access to the court. 4 ° In a six-tothree decision, the Court held that United States courts have
federal jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of
the detention of foreign
nationals captured abroad in connec4
tion with hostilities.1 '
The recent Supreme Court decisions require the government to provide procedures guaranteeing citizen detainees
due process of our laws. Unmistakably, the Bush administraHowever,
tion's antiterrorism policy experienced a setback.'
"[t]he government may well be able to satisfy the Court's lenient procedural standards without actually altering its morally dubious detention policies." 3
Interestingly, because Hamdiwas restricted to citizen de134. Id.
135. 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000).
137. Padilla,124 S. Ct. at 2722, 2724, 2727.
138. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
139. See id.
140. Id. at 2691.
141. Id. at 2699.
142. See Robert E. Greenberger, High Court Backs Detainees'Right to Challenge US, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2004, at Al; Alan Freeman, GuantanamoDetainees Have Right to Question Status Before Neutral Court, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL, June 29, 2004, at A28.
143. Ronald Dworkin, What the Court Really Said, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
Aug.12, 2004, at 26.
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tainees, and Padillawas dismissed, we must wait until other
legal challenges involving unlawful arrests or detentions of
individuals who have alleged ties to terrorist activities arise
to fully reexamine issues addressed in the internment cases
in this contemporary context. Until then, jurisprudence continues with the Supreme Court's segmented analyses.
VI. CONCLUSION

Race, Rights and Reparation contributes substantially to
the literature on Asian American legal scholarship and academic treatments on the internment. The casebook is hopefully the beginning of a more sophisticated, albeit difficult,
discourse on the balancing of civil liberties and national security during a time of war. This casebook will encourage law
students and legal scholars to critically examine their own
views about the internment and the war on terrorism during
this precarious time in American history. With this in mind,
readers should remember the most overarching lesson of the
internment of Japanese Americans: the government should
not target an entire ethnic group in the name of national security alone. Even during a time of crisis, civil rights and liberties must always be protected.
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